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PRIVATE RISK, PUBLIC RISK: PUBLIC
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THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
Daniel Immergluck

Abstract
This article describes the development of mortgage markets in the United States in the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the growth of high-risk market segments beginning in the 1990s.
It focuses on the federal role in the development of stable, risk-limiting products and markets. The
author then examines the growth of securitization, including structured finance and its impact on
mortgage markets. Finally, the article discusses the policy debates and developments surrounding
subprime and other high-risk mortgage lending from the 1990s through the 2007-2008 mortgage
crisis. The author concludes that knowledge of the problems and costs of high-risk lending had a
minimal impact on policy making and that mortgage markets are not well served by a deregulationist paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the boom in subprime and high-risk lending from 2002 to
2006—after an earlier escalation in the late 1990s—loan defaults and foreclosures surged in many parts of the country in 2006 and 2007.1 As the
subprime debacle evolved into a broader mortgage crisis, which later catalyzed national and global economic decline, the costs of failing to regulate
a new, high-risk mortgage market—revolutionized by private-label securitization—became painfully obvious. By early 2008, the mortgage crisis
had led to direct losses to investors in mortgage-backed securities in the
$350 to $420 billion range, but because these losses occured at leveraged
financial institutions, their full impact was estimated to be $2 trillion or
more.2 By August of 2008, write-downs and losses of mortgage-backed
securities by commercial and investment banks had climbed to over $500
billion, and were projected to end up at somewhere on the order of $1 trillion or more, even before accounting for leveraged impacts, and some were
predicting that total write-downs and losses would reach well beyond these
levels.3 The impacts on financial institutions were further magnified by the
use of credit default swaps and other derivative instruments.
By the fall of 2008, the problems of credit and financial markets had
grown so large that they had brought down a number of major financial
firms, including Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, and AIG, and
compelled the government takeover of the government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Even more broadly, the financial crisis had spread to commercial paper markets and inter-bank lending, slowing credit flows in these markets and affecting a much broader segment of
the real economy. These developments led the Treasury Department, together with the Federal Reserve Board, to push for a major federal program
to purchase distressed mortgage-backed and related securities from financial institutions.4 After some substantial fits and starts, the Emergency
1. Based on Mortgage Bankers Association data, the number of loans entering foreclosure in the fourth quarter of 2007 topped 400,000, up from under 200,000 per quarter as recently as 2005 and under 100,000 as recently as 1999. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES
OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2008),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2008/son2008_executive
_summary.pdf.
2. See ADRIAN BLUNDELL-WIGNALL, THE SUBPRIME CRISIS: SIZE, DELEVERAGING AND
SOME POLICY OPTIONS 10 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/27/
40451721.pdf.
3. See Yalman Onaran, Banks Subprime Losses Top $500 Billion on Writedowns,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
a8sW0n1Cs1tY&refer=home.
4. See Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02crisis.html.
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Economic Stabilization Act was passed which provided for a $700 billion
Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”), which provided the ability to
buy mortgage-backed securities and to invest in equity shares of financial
institutions.5
As the country’s attention moved from a severe, but narrower, subprime
mortgage crisis to a much broader national and global economic crisis, less
notice was given to the costs of the heavy and concentrated foreclosures
caused by subprime lending. Borrowers lost their homes and saw their
credit records decimated. Many renters—who clearly had no role in the
mortgage process—found themselves with little notice to vacate their
homes. Neighborhoods around the country were littered with vacant and
abandoned properties, which can depress the values of nearby homes and
create havens for blight and crime.6 The problems were not just confined
to the inner-city. In some places, entire suburban or exurban subdivisions
that had been planned or started at the peak of the high-risk lending boom
in the mid-2000s were left half-empty or worse. Cities and suburbs were
forced to become custodians of abandoned properties in order to slow the
contagion effects of derelict properties.7
This Article describes the development of mortgage markets in the
United States during the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on the
growth of high-risk market segments beginning in the 1990s. Part I provides a brief look at the history of institutional mortgage markets in the
United States, with particular focus on the federal role in the development
of stable, risk-limiting products and markets. Part II turns to the growth of
securitization. It then discusses structured finance and its impacts on mortgage markets, again with specific attention to the role of federal policy in
nurturing these systems. Finally, Part III discusses the policy debates and
developments surrounding subprime and other high-risk mortgage lending
from the 1990s through the 2007–2008 mortgage crisis.

5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/hp1207.htm.
6. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND
THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 149-53 (2009) [hereinafter IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED].
7. See Daniel Immergluck, Community Response to the Foreclosure Crisis: Thoughts
on Local Interventions 11-17 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Discussion Paper No. 01-08,
2008), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/dp_0108.pdf.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK-LIMITING MORTGAGE MARKETS IN
THE UNITED STATES
The structure of homeownership finance played a key role in the relatively limited extent of homeownership in the United States through the
early decades of the twentieth century. Prior to the late nineteenth century,
institutional lending for homeownership was relatively rare, although early
forms generally date back to the first terminating building society in 1831.8
For the nonaffluent, owner occupancy was usually achieved during this
pre-institutional period through some combination of doing one’s own construction, extensive household savings, borrowing from individuals, and
land contract financing.9
It is no coincidence that institutional lending in the United States and in
England grew substantially with the Second Industrial Revolution and large
scale urbanization in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Rural homesteaders faced fewer obstacles to homebuilding and ownership than urban households. Land was relatively inexpensive and materials could generally be harvested off the land. As cities grew and land
values rose, however, working class and modest-income families could
rarely afford to buy land and build a house without some sort of financing
over time.10
The rise of stable, risk-limiting mortgage finance markets in the broad
middle part of the twentieth century—epitomized by the long-term dominance of the plain-vanilla thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage—was dependent
on a persistent and substantive role for the federal government. The timeline of U.S. mortgage market development and change is not one of bright
lines and clear boundaries, although there were certainly periods during
which change occurred quite rapidly. Rather, different outside forces—
including those based in technology, policy, and demography—interacted
with each other to produce new financial products and practices, changes in
the structure of the financial services industry, and various opportunities
and vulnerabilities among homeowners and would-be homeowners in different parts of the country.

8. See DAVID MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831–1995, at 17-18 (2004).
9. Land contract financing involves a “buyer” agreeing to make monthly payments (on
top of what is usually a substantial up front deposit) over a fixed period for occupancy with
some notion that, possibly after repeated contract renewals, the buyer will assume ownership. They resemble rent-to-own arrangements. See Marc A. Weiss, Marketing and Financing Home Ownership: Mortgage Lending and Public Policy in the United States,
1918-1989, 18 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 110 (1989).
10. Id. at 110-11.
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The Local Building and Loan

From the early decades of the twentieth century through at least the
1970s, it is arguable that no single type of lender was more important to the
development of government-supervised, risk-limiting mortgage markets
than the building and loan (“B&L”), later called the savings and loan
(“S&L”). The B&L became a major provider of mortgage credit, and because of its direct and indirect impacts on the structure of home finance and
the mortgage market itself. Traditional, permanent B&Ls developed into a
significant industry in the later decades of the nineteenth century.11 Early
B&Ls were primarily local institutions, with many members knowing each
other or having some common association. Social and geographic cohesiveness gave them an informational advantage that kept underwriting costs
and defaults low. B&L members/borrowers depended on the solvency and
profitability of the B&L, and the fate of the B&L rested closely with the
success of borrowers.12
Besides B&Ls, life insurance and mortgage companies were important
providers of mortgages in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
centuries.13 Mortgage companies made loans and then sold either individual loans (what would now be called “whole loan” sales) or bonds backed
by the loans to investors. The bonds sold by mortgage companies, however, were not like the mortgage-backed securities that became so common
in the late twentieth century. These bonds more closely resembled corporate bonds because they remained general obligations of the originating
mortgage company, and the underlying mortgages remained on the books
of the mortgage company.14
Local B&Ls grew significantly in the early twentieth century—
supported to some degree by state-level regulation that had begun in the
late nineteenth century—and maintained their emphasis on homeownership

11. The early B&Ls, which date to well before the Civil War, were actually local “terminating building societies.” Those joining a terminating B&L would make regular payments on shares they purchased in the B&L as a form of savings. Once enough capital was
accumulated in the B&L to build or purchase a house, the capital was auctioned off to the
member willing to pay the highest interest. Once everyone had paid for their loans in full,
the organization closed its doors. See MASON, supra note 8, at 18.
12. Michael J. Lea, Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Perspective, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 147, 154-55 (1996), available at http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/
files/hpd%207(1)/hpd%207(1)%20lea.pdf.
13. Id. at 156-59.
14. See D. M. Fredericksen, Mortgage Banking in America, 2 J. POL. ECON. 203, 210-15
(1984); see also KENNETH A. SNOWDEN, MORTGAGE COMPANIES AND MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 11-12 (2008), available at http://www.uncg.edu/
bae/people/snowden/Wat_jmcb_aug07.pdf.
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finance.15 After the Panic of 1907 and through the boom period of the
early 1920s, the number of local B&Ls grew, buttressed by the social and
cultural mores that favored homeownership and by the general growth in
real estate and the economy.16 With the real estate collapse of the late
1920s and the onset of the Great Depression, the number of B&Ls declined, but at the beginning of the Great Depression, B&Ls made about
one-fifth of home mortgages in the United States.17 Moreover, commercial
banks tended to fare even worse than B&Ls in the early 1930s, in part because bank depositors could withdraw their funds more quickly than those
who held B&L shares, which exacerbated bank runs and failures.
There were significant differences in the structure and nature of credit
provided by various types of lenders. B&Ls provided longer-term loans
with higher loan-to-value ratios (but still rarely ever exceeding 80%) than
banks or insurance companies.18 In the 1920s, the average term of mortgages was eleven years for those written by B&Ls, versus six to eight for
those from insurance companies and two to three for those from commercial banks.19 Average loan-to-value ratios were 60% for B&Ls and 50%
for those from other lenders.20 The shorter term, interest-only loans with
relatively low loan-to-value ratios made by banks and insurance companies
were known as “straight” mortgages. Homeowners with these loans had to
take out new loans much more frequently, and so would incur the up-front
costs associated with more frequent borrowing. The limited loan-to-value
ratios of these loans typically required the involvement of a substantial second mortgage which came with very high fees and interest rates. They

15. See MASON, supra note 8, at 28-29, 37-39.
16. Id. at 53-54, 59-60.
17. Id. at 60.
18. Loan-to-value ratios are important in underwriting loans for lenders and borrowers
for several reasons. From the lender’s perspective, a lower loan-to-appraised value means
that, in case of foreclosure, the lender is more likely to recover the full value of the principal
lent, especially in the event of falling property values. A lower loan-to-value also tends to
be associated with a larger down-payment, which means that the borrower has put more of
his or her own money into the property. From the borrower’s perspective, lower loan-tovalue ratios can protect them in the case of falling property values by allowing them to refinance or sell the home without an out-of-pocket loss. Lower loan-to-values may, however,
also make it more difficult for the borrower to afford the down-payment on a home. One
alternative is to secure a second, subordinate loan to supplement the primary, first mortgage.
Private mortgage insurance was developed to allow lenders to provide higher loan-to-value
ratios (larger first loans) to reduce down payment requirements.
19. See Lea, supra note 12, at 162.
20. See id.

IMMERGLUCK_CHRISTENSEN

2009]

4/21/2009 3:54:04 PM

PRIVATE RISK, PUBLIC RISK

453

were typically offered by marginal participants in the financial industry and
were often unregulated and operated in violation of state usury laws.21
B.

The 1930s: Federal Leadership in Home Finance

By the early 1920s, the federal government had become a supporting—
and sometimes catalyzing or initiating—actor in the promotion of homeownership in the United States.22 It was not until the 1930s, however, that
Congress and the executive branch became key participants in the development, expansion, and direction of homeownership and mortgage finance.
Before the 1930s, many Americans, even many with decent incomes, found
it very hard to borrow sufficient funds to purchase a home. The homeownership rate at the turn of the century was just above 46% and, despite the
very large economic expansion of the 1920s, it had climbed to only just
under 48% by 1930.23 Up until 1940, the U.S. homeownership rate remained relatively low compared to post-World War II levels.
Initial federal involvement in the mortgage market is often attributed to
President Roosevelt’s New Deal. To be sure, the 1934 National Housing
Act,24 which created the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), was
one of the most important pieces of housing legislation in the twentieth
century. It followed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, however,
which President Hoover proposed and signed.25 This bill created the Home
Loan Bank system to provide liquidity to savings and loans to increase

21. HOME FINANCE AND TAXATION: LOANS, ASSESSMENTS, AND TAXES ON RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY 28 (John M. Gries & James Ford eds., 1932).
22. See Lawrence J. Vale, The Ideological Origins of Affordable Homeownership Efforts, in CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP 19-24 (W. Rohe & H. Watson eds., 2007).
23. When compared to some other countries, the U.S. rate was not particularly low, but
this was partly attributable to the relatively rural nature of the U.S. at the time and to the desire of recent immigrants to own their own home. See Richard Harris & Chris Hamnett, The
Myth of the Promised Land: The Social Diffusion of Home Ownership in Britain and North
America, 77 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 173-90 (1987). Reliable data on homeownership rates between decennial censuses at the national level are not available for the 1920s.
The real estate sector had slowed down in the late 1920s prior to the stock market crash of
late 1929. See Ernest Fisher, Changing Institutional Patterns of Mortgage Lending, 5 J. FIN.
307-10 (1950). Therefore, it is very likely that the homeownership rate in the 1920s peaked
before 1930. It is unlikely, however, that it hit rates substantially above 50% given the substantial barriers to ownership.
24. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1749 (2006)).
25. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (2006)); see also SUSAN HOFFMAN, POLITICS AND BANKING: IDEAS,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 160-61 (2001).
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their role in the mortgage market.26 Hoover and others saw the longerterm, higher loan-to-value amortizing mortgage provided by savings and
loans as a key tool in promoting homeownership and stimulating the housing market.27 The law gave the federal government a significant role in
promoting and standardizing the mortgage market. Government not only
authorized, but also invested in, the creation of the new secondary market
institutions by initially capitalizing the Home Loan Banks. Member institutions were required to purchase small amounts of stock to become the
owners of the Banks over time.
The Home Loan Bank system fostered a new standardization and federal
endorsement of the B&L-type loan. It was also the first direct government
vehicle for dealing with the long-term/short-term liquidity mismatch that
faced B&Ls with short-term deposits. By allowing banks to “rediscount”
their mortgage assets, the government was creating liquidity, thereby
stimulating the mortgage and housing market. B&Ls were generally local
institutions, so imbalances could arise in terms of supply and demand for
credit in different parts of the country. The Home Loan Bank system also
provided for geographic redistribution of lending capital. Some older, developed areas had a surplus supply of lending capital, while other growing
areas had surplus demand for mortgages. The Home Loan Bank system
provided a system of “banks for banks,” in which thrifts could lend and
borrow through the regional Home Loan Bank, which in turn could exchange funds throughout the system. This redistributed funds throughout
the nation in a more efficient manner.
Like most government policy regarding financial markets, the Home
Loan Bank Act was contested. Insurance companies and mortgage companies who viewed B&Ls as competition and did not provide the B&L form
of loan argued against the bill at that time. They claimed that the Home
Loan Banks were unnecessary and encouraged unsound lending with
overly long maturities and excessive loan-to-value ratios. They argued that
the non-amortizing straight mortgage—essentially a short-term (three to
seven years), interest-only loan—was proper finance. By encouraging
longer-term mortgages, opponents argued, the Home Loan Banks would
encourage precisely the sort of overbuilding that helped cause the Depression in the first place.28
Roosevelt pushed for more aggressive interventions in the housing market. The Home Loan Banks did little in the near term for homeowners who

26. See HOFFMAN, supra note 25.
27. Id. at 160.
28. See id. at 167.
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were losing their homes through foreclosures. Moreover, because they
were wholesale institutions, the Banks were perceived as benefiting only
lenders and not borrowers.29 In fact, they were vulnerable to this charge in
part because, although the Home Loan Bank Act did call for direct lending,
the Banks did not have any such capacity.
Instead of merely reorganizing the Home Loan Banking System to suit
the demands for more direct assistance to homeowners, Roosevelt and
Congress passed the Home Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”) of 1933.30 HOLA
created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (“HOLC”), which purchased
mortgages in default from lenders using funds raised in the bond market.31
HOLC also made refinance loans directly to homeowners with the intent of
providing a more manageable loan.32 It was capitalized and owned by the
federal government and governed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
To enable homeowners to remain in their homes, HOLC used long-term
federal bonds to buy the loans, extend the term of loans, and lower monthly
payments.33 Up to 80% of the loans were fully amortizing over fifteen
years.34
HOLC has generally been perceived as successful. It made loans from
1933 to 1936 and did not incur substantial losses over the long term. The
HOLC received 1.9 million loan applications, accounting for approximately 40% of homes with residential mortgages during this period. The
HOLC funded approximately one million loans for a total of $3.1 billion.35
HOLC served approximately 20% of homeowners with existing mortgages,
a remarkable number.36 The HOLC has been accused of institutionalizing
redlining practices through the use of its risk rating maps.37 While the

29. A “wholesale institution” is one that does not lend directly to homeowners or homebuyers, but rather to lenders themselves. Institutions lending directly to homeowners or
homebuyers are considered “retail” institutions. For more information on wholesale lenders, see Jack Guttentag, Mortgage Lenders, Mortgage Brokers & Loan Officers, (Dec. 22,
2000), http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Type%20of%20Loan%20Provider/lenders
,_brokers_and_loan_officers.
30. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468c (2006)).
31. See C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORPORATION 7-13 (1951)
32. See Kristen B. Crossney & David W. Bartelt, The Legacy of the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation, 16 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 547, 551 (2005).
33. See HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 169-70.
34. Id. at 170.
35. See HARRISS, supra note 31, at 1-2.
36. Id.
37. See Crossney & Bartelt, supra note 32, at 571.
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agency’s maps may have furthered or reinforced redlining practices, it actually made many loans in areas that it rated as high-risk.
The next major development in federal mortgage policy was the National Housing Act of 1934, which created the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).38 The FHA was created in large part to stimulate job
creation, but was responsible for introducing a key credit enhancement that
had a strong direct effect on credit availability and served as a model for
modern private mortgage insurance, which became a critical tool in assisting homebuyers with less than 20% equity to purchase a house.
In addition to offering mortgage insurance, the FHA established the
twenty-year and later, thirty-year, fully amortizing, fixed-rate mortgage
with an 80% loan-to-value ratio as the dominant, standardized mortgage
format for the remainder of the twentieth century.39 FHA loans also increased the standardization of mortgages generally, setting the stage for the
eventual expansion of secondary market activity and securitization that
dominated the last quarter of the twentieth century.40 The FHA was a major force in the standardization and commoditization of mortgage credit.41
The FHA increased the supply of mortgage credit and allowed for predictable, low-risk, long-term financing, making the true effective costs of
financing lower and reducing the risks to borrowers due to uncertainties regarding the availability and pricing of credit in the future. From the 1930s
to the 1940s, the average term for mortgages made by S&Ls increased from
eleven years to fifteen years.42 For insurance companies, who were larger
FHA users, the average term increased from between six to eight years to
twenty years.43 Overall, the average loan-to-value for mortgages increased
from less than 60% to 75%, and the bulk of loans became fully amortizing,
helping homeowners to build equity over time.44
The FHA had a large impact on the overall housing market. From 1935
to 1939, FHA insured loans accounted for 23% of single-family lending.45

38. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, 1246 (codifed as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1749 (2006)), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/
martin/54_01_19340627.pdf.
39. Lea, supra note 12, at 161.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 161-63.
42. Id. at 162.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Kerry D. Vandell, FHA Restructuring Proposals: Alternatives and Implications, 6
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 308 (1995).
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This share grew to 45% during the years 1940 to 1944, while accounting
for 22% of outstanding residential mortgage debt by 1945.46
The end of World War II saw the advent of the Veterans Administration
(“VA”) program. Within one year after the war, VA-guaranteed mortgages
had increased from just 1% of outstanding residential mortgage debt to 9%
of such debt.47 From 1945 to 1956, during the peak of the postwar suburbanization boom, VA loans accounted for 35% of net new mortgage flows,
with the FHA accounting for another 14%.48 The FHA program gradually
declined in significance, until the late 1960s when Congress authorized a
substantial expansion of FHA activity, including a major subsidized loan
component.49 By 1970, FHA loans still accounted for almost 30% of single-family loans.50
The roles of the FHA and the VA in the mortgage market were also associated with a shift—at least for a while—away from the conventional
S&L delivery of mortgage finance and toward FHA/VA mortgages, for
which insurance companies and commercial banks were major lenders
(S&Ls were relatively smaller players in the FHA and VA loan market).
Insurance companies, who in the past had purchased individual loans or invested in mortgage company debentures, now began to develop correspondent relationships with mortgage companies, in which they would agree to
purchase pools of loans from the mortgage companies. These were not
mortgage-backed securities, which came later, but literally bulk purchases
of loans that the insurance company agreed to purchase once they were
made by the mortgage company.51
After introducing FHA insurance and before creating the VA loan, the
federal government created the Federal National Mortgage Association
(now known as Fannie Mae) in 1938 to create a secondary market in FHAinsured loans. Fannie Mae allowed a new form of intermediation between
non-depository mortgage originators such as mortgage companies and investment capital from other sources. This meant that a new source of capital became available for the mortgage market. In 1968, Fannie Mae became a “government-sponsored enterprise” (“GSE”), a for-profit, privately
owned corporation that is subject to some—albeit limited—federal over-

46. See id.; see also SAUL B. KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET
33 (1961), available at http://www.nber.org/books/klam61-1.
47. See KLAMAN, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Vandell, supra note 45, at 309.
51. See KLAMAN, supra note 46, at 245-48.
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sight.52 Its mission had also changed to focus on providing liquidity to the
non-GSE, or conventional, mortgage market.53
Thus, the two major “circuits” for U.S. housing finance both relied heavily on federal intervention and support over the course of their development.54 The S&L circuit was supported by deposit insurance and the Home
Loan Banks provided a critical source of liquidity, while also drawing
some support from FHA and VA programs. In the meantime, mortgage
companies, commercial banks, and insurance companies made loans supported by FHA and VA programs, and later by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Prior to the 1960s, the FHA/VA circuit was particularly important.
Beginning in the late 1960s, as VA and FHA programs declined in their
overall share of mortgages, the S&L circuit grew more dominant. This
generally persisted until the 1980s and the explosion of the GSE secondary
markets and securitization, which essentially superseded the old FHA/VA
circuit and once again favored nonlocal lenders such as mortgage companies.55 In both circuits, the public sector seeded, nurtured, and was largely
responsible for the size and functioning of mortgage markets, and especially the dominance of the long-term fixed rate mortgage.56
These markets were not without serious and pervasive problems, including discrimination and redlining.57 Their basic structure, however, constituted a sound base upon which to build a fairer system, and in the late
1960s and into the 1970s, a number of federal statutes—the Fair Housing
Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
and the Community Reinvestment Act—were adopted toward this end.
While implementation and enforcement of these laws were frequently lackluster, there were occasional periods of significant progress towards fair,
affordable, and sustainable home finance.58
C.

The Growth of Unstructured, Plain-Vanilla Securitization

Put most simply and broadly, mortgage securitization is a process in
which the funding of—or investments in—mortgage loans is separated
52. See Lea, supra note 12, at 164.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 152-53.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. “Redlining” refers to the practice of not offering or extending credit to certain
neighborhoods or submarkets due, in part, to the economic or racial composition of the residents of the area. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 236-45 (M.E. Sharpe ed.,
2004) [hereinafter IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT].
58. Id.
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from the origination (and originator) of the loans. The loans stand, together
in pools with many other loans, “on their own” and are no longer tied to the
fate of the originating lender.59 A key objective of securitization is to isolate the loans that eventually provide cashflow to the investors from the
originating lender. In general, the alternative is either for the loans to be
sold as individual “whole loans” to buyers who assume these loans as individual loans that they (or their agent) then service, or for the loan to remain
on the balance sheet of the lender. Debenture sales, like those used by the
early mortgage companies, are also an alternative, but have not been widely
used in the United States.
Securitization led directly to the widespread “vertical disintegration” of
the lending process. It enabled the origination process to be separated from
the process of the funding and servicing of the loan. This process has also
been called the unbundling of the mortgage process, although the term unbundling is less precise and can refer to several different mortgage market
processes. Vertical disintegration meant that more contractual relationships
were now required among originators, issuers of the securities, investors
that purchased the securities, credit rating agencies, servicers, and other
mortgage market participants.60 In the dominant S&L circuit, these functions were generally integrated within the local S&L that originated,
funded, and serviced the loan.
Mortgage securitization has often been portrayed as a private-sector financial innovation. Yet, in its early, less structured and complex forms, it
was the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the
federal agency that facilitates the purchase of FHA loans, that issued the
first residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBSs”) in 1970, guaranteeing interest and principal payments on pools of FHA- and VA-insured
mortgages.61 In the mid-1970s, Ginnie Mae also spurred the use of RMBSs
by directly subsidizing below-market-rate RMBSs so that investors would
get market-rate returns.62 RMBSs further increased the number and types
of investors in the mortgage market, as well as the number of new lenders
in the market.63 Also in 1970, the Emergency Home Finance Act created

59. For a more extensive discussion of securitization in mortgage markets see ADAM B.
ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 318, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (2008), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf.
60. See Michael G. Jacobides, Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration: How
and Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 465 (2005).
61. See CHARLES R. GEISST, VISIONARY CAPITALISM: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 91-93 (1990).
62. Id. at 92-93.
63. Id. at 93.
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the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, now Freddie Mac, to provide secondary market capacity for the Home Loan Bank system members
and allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to perform secondary market
operations for conventional mortgages.
The first generation of the RMBS was the “pass-through” certificate.
Prior to the development of the pass-through RMBS, lenders frequently
sought to convert loans into cash to replenish their cash available for lending and to reduce a variety of risks that can come from holding a large
amount of long-term mortgages on their balance sheets.
Ginnie Mae, and later Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, reduced the transaction costs of converting loans into cash. They purchased the loans and
assembled them into pools of similar types of loans. These pools also enabled the diversification of risk by including loans from many lenders and
different regions. They then issued “certificates,” in which the cash flow
generated by the loans in the pool was passed through to the investors in a
pro-rata fashion. This was a fairly straightforward and transparent process.
Again, in addition to the diversification of loans across lenders and regions,
a major apparent advantage for investors of these new securities compared
to the old-fashioned debenture issued by mortgage companies prior to the
Great Depression was the fact that these bonds were not as exposed to the
risk of the originating lender going bankrupt.
There are variations on the pass-through structure, including one in
which the GSE or Ginnie Mae does not actually purchase the loans, but
guarantees the loan pool that is assembled by another issuing firm. Regardless of the details, this sort of pass-through security does not involve any
complex hierarchical structuring into different layers of risk. Therefore,
such “single-class” pass-throughs are typically not classified as part of
what are known as “structured finance” vehicles.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac served as buyer-holders of loans in their
portfolios, as well as conduits of mortgage capital from investors to lenders. Securitization via the GSEs offered several advantages to lenders. It
provided greater diversification in risks in the value of the lender’s assets,
yielded more liquidity to lenders because these diversified assets are more
marketable than whole loans, and redistributed credit supply across regions,
so that regions with few local sources of credit suffered from fewer constraints on credit flows.
One consequence of the growth of securitization and the GSEs, however,
was that S&Ls lost market share to mortgage companies that had gained
access to inexpensive funds and were able to offer long-term, fixed rate
mortgages at competitive interest rates. The national scope of mortgage
companies and their lack of branches allowed them to benefit from econo-
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mies of scale and specialization. S&Ls were still both savings and lending
institutions that had relied upon their local knowledge for competitive advantage. In the age of securitization, such advantages were made much
less relevant by the commoditization and pooling of residential credit.
In its early forms at least, securitization promoted the standardization of
mortgage terms and underwriting requirements.64 This standardization was
accompanied by an increased supply of computer-processed and nationalscale credit information systems, reducing the benefit of local information.
Additionally, the scale and inherent subsidies of the secondary markets
meant that they offered lenders lower cost capital for making mortgages.
Loans became more standardized and “one-size-fits-all.” Mortgages increasingly resembled commodities rather than individualized products.
These changes also resulted in growing economies of scale for most of the
stages of the lending process, including funding and servicing. At the same
time, these large new national lenders—mostly mortgage companies or
bank-owned mortgage companies—developed more “wholesale” lending
channels, in which they originated loans through large numbers of sometimes quite small scale and often localized mortgage brokers.
D.

The Rise of Structured, Risk-Inducing Securitization

Pass-through RMBSs, though assisting in geographically diversifying
the underlying default risk that investors would face, did little to deal with
another sort of risk facing investors: prepayment timing risk. When interest rates decline, borrowers prepay their loan by refinancing. This can hurt
pass-through RMBS investors who had hoped for an ongoing, predictable
income stream from the RMBSs. At this point, however, it becomes difficult for these investors to find an investment opportunity that will generate
the same sort of return at similar levels of overall risk as the original investment in the security.
At least partly in order to deal with this problem, Freddie Mac issued the
first collateralized mortgage obligation (“CMO”) in 1983.65 A CMO is a
more complicated form of RMBS than a pass-through because it allocates
prepayment risk across different investors—some of whom are more willing to accept such risks than others—by structuring the security into different segments that pay back over varying schedules. Also, CMOs offer the
ability to create a vertical hierarchy of default risk by allowing some bond-

64. See Lea, supra note 12, at 166-68.
65. See Frank Nothaft, Chief Economist, Freddie Mac, Celebrating the Anniversary of
Revolutionary Concepts (May 12, 2003), http://www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/
commentary/051203_concepts.htm.
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holders to receive their principal back before others and some more risktolerant bondholders to bear losses associated with defaults of the underlying loans before the holders of less risky senior bonds. These different
segments of risk are called “tranches” (French for “slices”) and are generally classified according to the rating they receive from the credit rating
agencies, such as AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, etc.
CMOs and similar structured finance vehicles had an important impact
on mortgage markets because they essentially peeled apart various types
and degrees of risk and allocated these to different classes of investors depending on their appetite and tolerance for different sorts of risk. In this
way, investors who would not invest in a pass-through security backed by
loans exhibiting anything but the lowest default risks or were likely to prepay could invest in a bond that was designed to be highly secure. These
AAA senior tranche bonds would provide relatively modest interest rates to
investors, with lower-rated and riskier tranches earning higher interest
rates. CMOs also served investors with different preferences for when they
would receive their principal back and how much prepayment risk they
would likely bear.66 In these ways, CMOs appealed to a broader segment
of potential investors and drew in more capital into mortgage markets.
They also enabled the capital markets to provide credit to a wider spectrum
of credit risk at the borrower end.
Thus, securitization encouraged risk-based pricing (although how accurately the pricing matched the risk is subject to debate) rather than the traditional system of credit rationing, where essentially no institutional lender
would lend to borrowers below certain, more conservative risk thresholds.
In the brave new world of securitization, the more innovation employed,
and the more the mortgage cash flows were repackaged, the more risk
could be tolerated in the home financing transaction. As the risk at the
origination level increases, defaults and foreclosures increase, which produce substantial negative spillovers on communities and longer-term impacts on borrowers.
The issuance of mortgage-backed securities in the subprime market increased from $87 billion in 2001 to almost $450 billion by 2006.67 In the
“Alt-A” market, issuance of RMBSs increased from approximately $11 billion in 2001 to more than $365 billion by 2006.68 The combination of this

66. Id.
67. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 59, at 2.
68. Alt-A loans are mortgages that are generally made to borrowers with fairly strong
credit scores but that exhibit riskier features than prime loans due to the nature of the loan or
property. They are often made with little or no documentation of income or assets, for example. Id.
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explosive growth of securitization since 2001, as well as the decline of
GSE issuance from 2003 to 2006, meant that the securitization of subprime
and Alt-A loans together almost equaled total GSE issuance by 2006 ($814
billion versus $905 billion). Adding in the non-agency securitization of
jumbo mortgages meant that non-agency securitization exceeded GSE securitization ($1.033 trillion to $905 billion) in 2006.69
The simple growth of non-agency CMO-type RMBS was not the entire
story of why so much capital flowed into high-risk mortgage markets starting in 2002 and 2003. There were fundamental shifts in the financial engineering of mortgage securities, including most notably the vertical layering
of securities, which would themselves be comprised not just of underlying
mortgages, but also of RMBSs themselves—in other words, the creation of
securities that were themselves generated by cash flows from other securities. Thus, the borrowers were now even further removed from the eventual funders of their loans. In the first wave of nonagency securitization,
pension funds and other institutional investors would invest in RMBS
which were comprised of thousands of individual mortgages. They may be
very senior investors or higher-risk AA or BBB investors, and they relied
on the credit rating agencies to correctly evaluate the risks of the underlying loans and the tranches (based on available enhancements and the level
of subordination beneath their particular tranche).
A new form of highly complex security was used heavily for the subprime and Alt A mortgage markets—the collateralized debt obligation
(“CDO”). The CDO involved the additional layering between the institutional investor and the borrowers. In CDOs, RMBS bonds—particularly
those with less than AAA ratings—are themselves pooled with RMBS
bonds derived from other loan pools, which may be of varying quality or
ratings. The cash flows from these bonds are then pooled in the new CDO
special purpose vehicle and a new set of CDO bonds are produced, with
senior and subordinate tranches. By this tranching of the cash flow coming
from a pool of RMBS (and potentially other CDO bonds), the “sow’s ear”
of lower grade bonds produced what were thought to be “silk purses,” in
the form of higher rated CDO bonds. The CDO is generated from a spectrum of RMBS and sometimes other kinds of bonds, some of which may be
other CDO bonds. Of course this all presumes a great deal of knowledge of
the risk of the underlying mortgages or other assets, because now investors
are essentially betting that the arrangement of cash flows from a large
number of lower or mixed grade investments will yield some amount of
higher grade investments.

69. See id.
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The CDO increased the value of higher-risk, lower-rated CMO bonds,
thus increasing the markets’ overall appetite for higher risk lending. In order to provide credit enhancement to the higher rated, senior tranches of
CMOs, originators were often required to purchase the lowest-rated, highest risk “residual” tranches from the CMOs derived from their loans. Beyond reducing risk to higher-tranche investors, the assumption of the residual should theoretically encourage the lender to be more risk-averse in its
lending because it will absorb the first losses emanating from the loan pool.
The CDO market, however, enabled some lenders to sell off their residual
interests to CDO arrangers, thereby reducing its “skin in the game” or exposure to losses from its own lending practices.70
Another innovation employed in the second high-risk lending boom was
the structured investment vehicle (“SIV”). An SIV was a specialized investment company set up solely to purchase long-term, fixed income investment assets, such as mortgage-backed securities by using less expensive, shorter-term commercial paper.71 SIVs required the ability to borrow
frequently and inexpensively, both to remain liquid and to earn a profit.
Commercial and investment banks set up SIVs as off-balance sheet investments, to reduce their risk. Many banks, however, essentially guaranteed
the liquidity of SIVs, ensuring that they would refinance the commercial
paper debt if needed. Thus, when the credit crisis hit in 2007, many banks
were forced to essentially bail out the SIVs that they had set up and managed, sometimes actually acquiring their assets and putting them on the
banks’ balance sheet.72
What came to be known as “structured finance,” the engineering of
CMOs, CDOs, SIVs, and other complex mortgage-related investment vehicles, turned out to suffer from a broad array of perverse incentives and
transactional failures.73 Without sufficient regulatory oversight or interventions, these vehicles helped produce large amounts of default risk in the
origination of home loans.

70. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2040, 2066-68 (2007).
71. Standard & Poor’s, Structured Investment Vehicle Criteria, http://www2.
standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article_print/2,1,1,0,1031342466642.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
72. See Shannon Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate Seven SIVs
on Balance Sheet, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=amwIRXuKwRR8&refer=home.
73. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 59; see also IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED,
supra note 6, at 100-11.
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II. FEDERAL POLICY IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY: NURTURING
SECURITIZATION, THE DECLINE OF ORIGINATE-TO-HOLD LENDING,
AND BACK-DOOR DEREGULATION
Although Fannie Mae was created in 1938 and Ginnie Mae and Freddie
Mac introduced RMBSs in 1970 and 1971, the eventual dominance of securitization in mortgage markets by the late twentieth century is perhaps
best attributed to federal financial deregulation of the early 1980s followed
by some specific industry-supported legislation later in that decade. By
explicitly favoring the securitization circuit over the traditionally dominant
S&L circuit, federal policy-makers provided critical help in shifting the
structure of the mortgage industry in at least three ways: 1) from a predominantly local to a predominantly national system; 2) from an originateto-hold model to an originate-to-distribute model; and 3) from one in which
most loans were made by relatively more regulated lenders (S&Ls) to one
in which predominantly unregulated mortgage companies and a growing
set of essentially unregulated mortgage brokers dominated.74 Combined
with the failure of policy-makers and regulatory agencies to increase regulatory supervision of these emerging lenders and the federal preemption of
state regulations, these moves meant that the path toward greater overall
deregulation of the mortgage marketplace was well paved by the middle to
late 1980s. Moreover, legislators and regulators constructed policy that allowed for regulated depository institutions, especially commercial banks, to
acquire or affiliate with these less regulated entities so that the new financial conglomerates could conduct most of their mortgage lending through
less regulated and supervised mortgage company subsidiaries and affiliates,
thereby minimizing regulatory oversight.
A critical ingredient to the growth of securitization was the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198075
(“DIDMCA”), which phased in the general abolition of state usury limits
on first mortgages by 1986.76 DIDMCA also extended the ability of na-

74. “Originate-to-hold” lending, or sometimes called “portfolio lending,” is a process in
which a lender makes a loan and does not sell or securitize it afterwards. The lender holds
the loan “in portfolio,” until it is paid off or defaults. “Originate-to-distribute” lending is the
alternative, and can take several forms. The lender originates the loan but then relatively
quickly sells it to another party or bundles it with other loans either for a bulk sale or securitizes it directly. See Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the
Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis (Mar. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1167786.
75. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
76. See PATRICIA A. MCCOY & ELIZABETH RENUART, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SUBPRIME AND NONTRADITIONAL HOME

IMMERGLUCK_CHRISTENSEN

466

4/21/2009 3:54:04 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVI

tional banks (those regulated by the OCC) to be governed only by the usury
limits of their home state to most other types of depository institutions.77
This ability, labeled “interest rate exportation,” allowed depositories to
generally override state usury limits. The ability to export rates from low
regulation states, which was given to national banks in a 1978 Supreme
Court decision, made it harder to regulate from the state level and allowed
large national lenders increased advantages in the marketplace, again increasing returns to scale in the industry.78
With the adoption of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act79
(“AMTPA”) in 1982, federal policy-makers continued moving to override
state consumer credit protections and make it easier to commoditize credit
at a national scale, thus fueling large scale delocalized lending sources.80
AMTPA overrode state laws that regulated various terms of “alternative”
loans, including those with features such as adjustable interest rates and
balloon payments.81 The law also allowed mortgage companies, which are
primarily state-regulated, to opt for federal regulations issued by the federal
S&L regulator (now the Office of Thrift Supervision) rather than comply
with the lending regulations of the state in which they were operating.
Thus, AMTPA provided significant federal preemption to non-depository
lenders, similar to the expanded federal preemption that DIDMCA had
provided to depository institutions. And these non-depositories were precisely the sort who relied especially on securitization as a means of funding
their loans. Ironically, DIDMCA and AMTPA were partly designed to
help S&Ls recover from their struggles in the financial marketplace. In the
long run at least, they most likely did the opposite.
The RMBS market grew during the decade, with issuance by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac increasing from $14 billion in 1982 to $160 billion
in 1986.82 In addition to the policy changes, the development of the CMO
was a parallel factor in RMBS growth, but it is unlikely that this level of
growth would have occurred without the deregulatory actions in DIDMCA
and AMTPA.

MORTGAGES 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id. at 5, 16-17.
79. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1545 (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
80. Id. at 6-7.
81. Id. at 6, 17.
82. See Peter Chinloy, Public and Conventional Mortgages and Mortgage-Backed Securities, 6 J. HOUSING RES. 173, 186 (1995).
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The early 1980s were also important for laying the groundwork for later
policy changes that directly supported mortgage securitization. In 1981,
President Reagan created the President’s Commission on Housing in part to
look at housing finance problems, including unstable interest rates and the
problems they caused for the mortgage market. In 1982, the Commission
found that:
a broader-based and more resilient system will be needed to supply the
funds a strengthened housing finance system will require. . . . [T]he nation
can no longer rely so completely on a system of highly regulated and specialized mortgage investors and a single type of mortgage instrument if
the strong underlying demand for housing credit is to be met.83

As the director of the Commission later recalled, the Commission argued
that all sorts of lenders and borrowers should have “unrestricted access” to
the money and capital markets. Moreover, the Commission advocated that
mortgage-market participants—and by this it appears they were thinking
more of investors and originators than of borrowers—should have “reliable
ways of managing interest-rate risk.”84 The Commission went on to recommend a variety of specific policy proposals to more closely and easily
link broader capital markets to the “underlying demand” for housing credit.
These included exempting RMBS from taxation at the issuing level, having
the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgate regulations for
streamlined self-registration of issuing RMBS, and other regulatory
changes.
At least two statutes followed directly from the recommendations of the
President’s Commission. First, the 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act85 (“SMMEA”) facilitated non-GSE or “private-label” securitization in various ways, including exempting RMBSs from state-level
registration and expanding the ability of banks and thrifts to hold RMBSs
as assets on their balance sheets.86 The CMO was also directly supported
by a piece of the 1986 Tax Reform Act,87 which created the Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”), a legal structure for trusts that
are used in structured RMBS, especially CMOs. REMICs eliminated any
83. Kent W. Colton, The Report of the President’s Commission on Housing: The Nation’s System of Housing Finance, 11 REAL EST. ECON. 133 (1983).
84. See Kent W. Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of
the U.S. Housing Finance System 11 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working
Paper W02-5, 2002).
85. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat.
1689 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1 (2006)).
86. See MCCOY & RENUART, supra note 76, at 8 & n.40.
87. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codifed in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C).
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problems with potential “double” taxation of cash flows as they flow
through the CMO.88
By furthering securitization and enabling lenders utilizing the secondary
markets to provide loans at lower cost, at greater scale, and across a larger
geographic scope, DIDMCA and the pro-securitization policies put pressure on traditional, localized S&Ls. They had difficulty competing on
price or terms. Larger, national scale mortgage companies could provide
loans at lower cost, in part because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac passed on
some of their explicit and implicit federal subsidies in the form of lowercost capital.
The Garn-St. Germain Act89 also allowed depositories to cross state lines
to acquire failing institutions, providing the first major move toward interstate banking.90 At the same time, depositories capitalized on the increasing failures of thrifts and banks to argue for eliminating limitations on intrastate bank branching. Then, in the late 1980s, more changes in bank and
thrift regulation supported the growth of securitization even more. The
1989 Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act91
(“FIRREA”)—the S&L “bailout” bill—required thrifts to rid themselves of
loans to improve their liquidity and lower their risks. This was followed
shortly by similar rules for banks via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) of 1991.92 Mortgages in portfolio received a 50% reserve requirement rating while RMBSs received only
20%.93 This effectively increased the cost to depositories of holding loans
in portfolios.
By the 1990s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s loan purchases accounted
for more than one half of new mortgage originations. The preemption of
state consumer protections increased the market for RMBSs by increasing
the returns to investors (by increasing fees and rates paid by borrowers).
By stoking the creation and growth of a new set of lenders, by removing
88. Id.
89. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
90. See DAVID R. ALLARDICE ET AL., THE GARN-ST. GERMAIN DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
ACT OF 1982: THE IMPACT ON BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 19 (1983), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/1983/ep_mar_apr1983_part1
_garcia.pdf.
91. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
92. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
93. FED. RESERVE BD., DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AMONG
THE FEDERAL BANKING AND THRIFT AGENCIES (1999), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/rptcongress/differences/default.htm.
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deposit rate regulations favoring S&Ls, and by fostering the development
of the mortgage brokerage industry, federal policy essentially constituted
the death-knell for S&Ls and installed a regime of both governmentsponsored and private-label securitization as the dominant sources of mortgage capital.
The decline of the S&L circuit (thrifts) began in the mid-1970s as
RMBS issuance began. When S&L market share began dropping in the
1980s it was essentially absorbed by GSE RMBSs. Private label RMBSs
began slowly in the mid-1980s but began to grow at a faster pace in the
early 1990s, as the early subprime mortgage market developed. By 1995,
the GSEs and GSE mortgage RMBSs accounted for 51% of outstanding
mortgage credit.94 Banks had reached a share of 19%, with thrifts down to
14%.95 Thrifts were down from a high of 58% in 1973 and 26% in 1989,
the year of the FIRREA savings and loan crisis bill.96 Private-label
RMBSs were just beginning to get started, rising from 2% of outstanding
mortgages in 1990 to 6% in 1995.97
III. POLICY DEBATES OVER REGULATING HIGH-RISK MORTGAGE
LENDING, 1995–2008
Much of the media coverage of the 2007–2008 mortgage crisis gave the
impression that the problems of high-risk lending had come as a total surprise to policy-makers. There was often little mention of well documented
problems in the high-risk mortgage market dating back to the middle-tolate 1990s and the decade-long policy battle over regulating subprime
loans. Federal regulators were said to be “asleep at the wheel” and somehow missed this major development in credit markets.98
The increase in high-risk mortgages from 2002–2007 followed a major,
albeit smaller, boom in subprime lending in the late 1990s. Some minor
changes in federal regulation of subprime refinance lending occurred in
2001 through changes to regulations implementing the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act99 (“HOEPA”) in response to problems during the
first subprime boom. The financial services industry, however, successfully fought off most calls for increased regulation.100
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
2190.
100.

See IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED, supra note 6, at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Regulatory Underkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2008, at A13.
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
See IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT, supra note 57, at 211-35.
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As problems of predatory lending and higher foreclosure rates among
subprime loans came to light in the late 1990s, consumer and community
groups around the country became increasingly focused on the issue.
There were concerns and policy debates over predatory and high-cost lending before the late 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, WashingtonD.C. based consumer advocates such as the National Consumer Law Center and others worked to get HOEPA passed in 1994.101 HOEPA was focused on increasing regulation of very high-cost home equity and refinancing loans. It established a threshold of loan pricing and loans priced over
this threshold became subject to special disclosures and a few prohibitions
of certain loan practices and terms. Consumer advocates argued for
stronger restrictions on high-cost loans, but were only successful at obtaining regulations that relied primarily on increasing disclosures to borrowers.
While HOEPA may have had some restraining effect on small, “hardmoney” lenders that charged interest rates in the high teens and low twenties, it did not restrain subprime lending in any meaningful way and may
have, in fact, provided the regulatory context for the growth of the market.
Besides relying mostly on additional disclosures as the fundamental way to
protect borrowers, HOEPA employed pricing thresholds or “triggers” over
which proscriptive regulations would kick in. These thresholds, however,
were generally much too high to address the vast majority of subprime
loans and could be easily avoided by pricing just under the threshold or by
shifting pricing from interest rates to up-front fees or contingent fees that
were not included in the pricing calculations.102 The subprime market actually grew faster after 1995, especially for refinance lending, the primary
target of HOEPA. With the explosion of the subprime market came the
growth of predatory lending and, soon, an increase in defaults and foreclosures as well.
In 1997, the Federal Reserve Board, which is responsible for adopting
regulations under the HOEPA, examined early implementation of the law.
The following year, the Board, together with the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, issued a joint report to Congress that addressed
issues such as loan-flipping, credit insurance, and related issues of abusive

101. See NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP, DEFENDING THE DREAM: HOW FUNDERS CAN
CURTAIL PREDATORY LENDING TO HELP INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES 25 (D. Visser ed.,
2006), available at http://www.nfg.org/publications/Defending_the_Dream_2006.pdf.
102. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REGARDING PROPOSED REGULATIONS RELATING TO
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN CONNECTION WITH MORTGAGE LENDING 5-6 (2007), available
at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/HOEPA-comm08.pdf.
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and predatory lending.103 Few of the recommendations, however, were
ever implemented.
Some states moved to increase regulation of subprime lending in the
middle-to-late 1990s.104 Some restricted the use of prepayment penalties or
balloon payments in mortgages. Other states tightened mortgage broker
and banker licensing and regulation. These laws, however, were generally
not very comprehensive and attacked only small pieces of the abusive and
predatory lending problem.
As subprime lending reached a critical mass in the late 1990s, the disproportionate concentration of high-risk loans in urban neighborhoods began to be felt more acutely, especially in the form of foreclosures and
abandoned housing. Moreover, subprime and predatory lending became
not just a consumer issue but also posed problems for community development. Concentrated foreclosures hurt neighborhoods and cities, adding
to the unfairness of the loss of homes to individual families.
A.

North Carolina Makes the First Big Move Toward More
Comprehensive Regulation of Subprime Loans

Advocates for stronger mortgage regulation found some initial success at
the state and local levels. In North Carolina, a state with a long history of
community reinvestment activism, a number of organizations became involved in the issue. These included the country’s largest community development credit union, the Center for Self-Help, as well as the Community
Reinvestment Association of North Carolina and the North Carolina Fair
Housing Center. This group formed the hub of the Coalition for Responsible Lending, which was able to gain the support of a major statewide
elected official, the attorney general, who played a significant role in the
legislative campaign. The legislature’s black caucus was also supportive.105
Advocates for increased regulation of subprime home loans in North
Carolina developed a bill that would go far beyond HOEPA in limiting the
practices that could be used in making high-cost loans. In the summer of
1999, the North Carolina legislature passed the first comprehensive antipredatory lending legislation in the country. The bill followed the thresh103. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & THE DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (1998), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf.
104. See Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Antipredatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 47, 49 (2008).
105. See IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT, supra note 57, at 212-13.
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old approach of HOEPA, but set the triggers significantly lower so that the
law would capture a substantial segment of subprime loans while avoiding
prime loans. It then prohibited certain lending features that, in the case of
high-cost lending, were often viewed as predatory. The bill was supported
by both the Mortgage Bankers Association of North Carolina and the North
Carolina Association of Mortgage Brokers.
Following the North Carolina law, two states, New York and Massachusetts, issued regulations aimed at the predatory lending problem, although
these measures were substantially weaker than the North Carolina legislation. Other states began debating similar measures. On the local level, the
City of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, each proposed local ordinances
aimed at the problem in early 2000.106 Unlike the North Carolina legislation, the Chicago and Cook County ordinances did not call for regulating
lenders. Rather, the proposals relied on a significant history of local laws
aimed at encouraging banks to be socially responsible by linking government financial business to responsible banking. Chicago, for example, had
an ordinance dating back to 1974 that required banks accepting municipal
deposits to disclose data on their lending in the city.
The Chicago ordinance and others like it in Oakland, Atlanta, Dayton,
Cleveland, and Detroit sought to withdraw municipal business from firms
engaged in predatory lending. These laws followed earlier municipal deposit ordinances aimed at encouraging banks to reinvest in urban neighborhoods. They also bore close resemblance to anti-Apartheid ordinances that
many cities passed in the 1980s, in which cities refused to do business with
firms that invested in South Africa. The industry responded quickly by appealing to state legislatures, where they had more lobbying experience and
relationships, to override the local ordinances. Some of the local predatory
lending ordinances—including those in Detroit, Dayton, and Cleveland—
were soon overridden by state legislation or by state courts. By preempting
these incentive ordinances, state legislatures or courts told local governments that they did not have a right to choose the financial institutions with
which they did business.
B. Lenders, the GSEs, and the Credit Rating Agencies Fight
Attempts to Regulate High-Risk Mortgage Lending at the State Level
Following the initial actions of a few early states, other states continued
to consider more comprehensive antipredatory lending regulations. By

106. See Malcom Bush & Daniel Immergluck, Research, Advocacy and Community Reinvestment, in ORGANIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL: ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 162-64 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2003).
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2007, all but seven states had some manner of “mini-HOEPA” statutes or
sets of laws restricting prepayment penalties, balloon payments, or predatory practices or terms.107 There was great variation, however, in both
what sorts of loans these statutes covered and the extent to which the laws
proscribed various practices or products.108 Many state statutes were not
very comprehensive or very strong. Some essentially just recreated the
federal HOEPA protections in state law. Many so-called “anti-predatory
lending” laws at the state level had been heavily influenced by state banking lobbyists. The result was that the pricing thresholds over which the
regulations would kick in were often the same as the very high federal
HOEPA thresholds and the restrictions themselves were often very minimal.
When consumer advocates and community organizations made efforts to
strengthen lending regulations, they were often thwarted by industry advocates and lobbyists. Banking and financial services lobby groups have traditionally had a great deal of influence over state legislatures in the mortgage regulation arena. Moreover, federal banking laws put pressure on
state legislatures to accommodate banking interests. Because banks are allowed to export interest rate and fee regulations from their home state, they
often aggressively lobby state legislatures for favorable regulations that
they can then use to override regulations in other states.
Economic development has frequently been used as a major argument in
such lobbying. Lenders sometimes agree to maintain facilities—or simply
the “main office” location—in the home state in exchange for favorable
regulations. Some states have gone so far as passing laws aimed at encouraging bank locations and facilities by reducing regulations in exchange for
economic development commitments by the institutions. Delaware, for example, passed a law in 1981 that eliminated fee and rate restrictions on
consumer loans and reduced income taxes in exchange for employing at
least 100 people in the state.109 Other banks have worked to win regulatory
concessions on mortgage regulations, which they can then export around
the country. A very large bank lobbied the Illinois legislature unsuccessfully in 2000 and 2001 to gain exemption from essentially any regulations
on fees for second mortgages, a freedom which it would then be able to export to other states. The bank holding company argued that economic development would occur as a result of the policy and threatened to locate its

107. See Bostic et al., supra note 104, at 50-52.
108. Id.
109. See IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT, supra note 57, at 212.
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new main charter in Ohio or another state if the deregulatory bill did not
pass.110
Key actors in state-level policy debates were the GSEs Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and the three primary credit rating agencies, Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. These firms had significant leverage over
state policy-makers. The GSEs could refuse to purchase certain types of
loans in a state. The rating agencies could refuse to rate mortgage-backed
securities containing loans covered by certain state laws, severely limiting
regular liquidity and marketability of such loans, at least in the near term.
Beginning in Georgia in early 2003, the GSEs and the credit rating
agencies became actively involved in influencing state legislation by proclaiming that it would not rate securities containing any loans covered by
the state’s new antipredatory lending law.
In 2001, on the heels of the hearings held around the country on predatory lending by federal agencies, Senator Vincent Fort introduced an antipredatory lending bill in the Georgia state legislature.111 In the next session
in 2002, Governor Roy Barnes, an ally of Fort’s on the predatory lending
issue, introduced what was to become the Georgia Fair Lending Act
(“GFLA”). After undergoing a number of changes, the bill was passed and
went into effect in late 2002. The law was immediately considered one of
the strongest state anti-predatory lending laws in the country. Built off of
North Carolina’s statute, the Georgia law was stronger, especially because
it held purchasers of loans accountable for violations of the law, in what is
known as assignee liability, something the North Carolina law lacked. Assignee liability was a key issue, because it meant that a regulatory violation
followed the loan through the securitization process and affected subsequent parties in the chain of capital. This essentially overrode the problem
created by the holder-in-due-course doctrine, which enabled funders of
loans to shield themselves from liabilities created by predatory and abusive
practices by brokers and others in the origination process.
Immediately after the law went into effect, the lending and mortgage
brokerage industry began a concerted campaign to overturn it, especially
after Governor Barnes lost his reelection bid in late 2002.112 They gained
their most important ally in early 2003, when Standard & Poor’s issued a

110. See Greg Hinz, Lobbying Bid Falls Short for Bank One; Dimon’s Bill All But Dead
for Veto Session, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Nov. 19, 2001, at 4.
111. Letter from Vincent D. Fort, Georgia State Senator, Dist. 39, to Leo C. O’Neill,
President, Standard & Poor’s (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
secrs/2006/august/20060808/op-1253/op-1253_5_1.pdf.
112. See Jack Milligan, Learning THE Hard Way, 64 MORTGAGE BANKING 26, 30
(2004).
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press release saying that it would not rate securities backed by Georgia
mortgages for fear that some of the underlying loans might violate GFLA.
The press release stated:
Loans governed by the GFLA are categorized as “Home Loans”, “Covered Home Loans”, or “High Cost Home Loans”, with each category having its own requirements and, in the case of Covered Home Loans and
High Cost Home Loans, fees, points, and annual percentage rate tests.
According to Standard & Poor’s, violations of the statute will subject noncomplying parties to potentially severe liability. Most importantly, however, the GFLA subjects assignees of Home Loans that violate the Act to
potential liability. Thus, transaction parties in securitizations, including
depositors, issuers and servicers, might all be subject to penalties for violations under the GFLA.113

This press release, which was later followed by similar actions by
Moody’s and Fitch, was the critical factor in enabling opponents of GFLA
to severely weaken the law by essentially removing the assignee liability
provision. In a letter to Standard & Poor’s CEO, Senator Fort pointed out
that Standard & Poor’s misconstrued the original GFLA assignee liability
provision, which actually only applied to high-cost loans.114 The letter also
asked Standard & Poor’s to identify and explain the firm’s financial relationships with lenders, issuers, and brokers, suggesting that the firm may
have been suffering from conflicts of interest and benefiting from continued securitization of high-risk products.115 It was not long before lending
industry advocates had managed to have GFLA replaced by a much weaker
law, in which the assignee liability provisions were effectively gutted.
Contrary to some of the media discussion that followed the Georgia debate, rating agencies could rate securities with assignee liability provisions,
as long as the potential damages from the provisions could be quantified.116
Nonetheless, efforts to create assignee liability provisions in state or federal
regulations, even when damages were made quantifiable, were a key flashpoint for industry advocates in mobilizing against regulation.

113. See Press Release, Mortgage Banker’s Ass’n of Am., Standard & Poor’s to Disallow
Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans (Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.mortgagebanker.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/32153.htm.
114. See Letter from Vincent D. Fort to Leo C. O’Neill, supra note 111.
115. Id.
116. Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 2094.
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Federal Agencies Study Abusive Lending and Regulators Warn of
Subprime Risks to Banks

In 1999 and 2000, a variety of developments were putting pressure on
federal regulators to act on the predatory lending problem. In 1998, lower
mortgage rates and higher prepayment rates lowered subprime lender profitability. Moreover, many subprime lenders experienced higher default
rates than they had anticipated.117 On top of this the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997 and 1998 made raising capital much more difficult.
The result was the failure of a significant number of subprime lenders.
On the policy front, states were looking closely at the North Carolina
law and a variety of localities were considering local ordinances aimed at
slowing abusive lending. In 1999, the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) and the U.S. Treasury Department created a
Task Force to develop federal policy recommendations to address predatory lending.118 The HUD-Treasury Task Force held hearings in five large
cities in the spring of 2000 and issued a report in June containing a number
of federal policy recommendations, including calling on the Federal Reserve Board to use more of its authority under HOEPA to outlaw predatory
practices.
In Congress, separate and opposing bills were introduced in Congress
backed by consumer and industry interest groups. In May 2000, the House
Banking Committee held a hearing on predatory lending in which the Federal Reserve Board was chastised by Chairman Jim Leach (R-IA) for not
using its authority to act on the issue. The Federal Reserve had not acted
on the recommendations made in the 1998 joint Federal Reserve-HUD
HOEPA report. Chairman Leach asked, “if there is a problem out there, if
Congress has given very strong authority to regulators and the Federal Reserve, our regulators, is the Federal Reserve AWOL? That is a question
that I think demands a response.”119
Even before the surge of federal policy activity in 1999 and 2000, federal bank regulators had recognized the growth of subprime lending and at
117. Letter from Emory Rushton, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy, U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Chief Executive Officers of All Nat’l
Banks, Dep’t & Div. Heads & All Examining Personnel (Mar. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/resources/retail/occ-bl-99-10_interag_guid_subprime_
lending.pdf.
118. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING (2000).
119. See Predatory Lending Practices: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 106th Cong. 54-55 (2000) (statement of James Leach, Chairman, Comm. on
Banking and Financial Services), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/
hba64810.000/hba64810_0.htm.
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least its risks to lenders. In March 1999, the four bank and thrift regulators
issued an “Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending.”120 This guidance,
however, was clearly focused on the need for depository institutions to
minimize any institutional risk that they may have had in holding high-risk
subprime loans on their balance sheets. The eight page guidance devoted
less than half of a page to concerns over consumer protection, and much of
this was concerned with how well banks “identify, monitor and control the
consumer protection hazards associated with subprime lending.”121 The
guidance did address some of the risks that originators faced in making and
securitizing subprime loans, but did not address the risks that banks and
thrifts took on in purchasing subprime mortgage-backed securities to hold
on their balance sheets.
State and local policy developments, the HUD-Treasury report, and public and congressional concern led the Federal Reserve Board to hold public
hearings in four large cities in the summer and fall of 2000 on potential revisions to HOEPA regulations. At the end of 2000, the Board proposed
some significant, albeit modest, changes to the HOEPA rules. The largest
changes in the rules involved classifying single-premium credit insurance
(“SPCI”) within the definition of fees under HOEPA and lowering the interest rate threshold at which a loan would be classified as “high-cost.”
The former meant that almost any loan with single premium credit insurance would be classified as a high-cost loan under HOEPA (since SPCI
typically exceeds the 8% point fee trigger in the law), thereby increasing
the disclosures and protections associated with the loan. The latter meant
that more high-rate loans would be covered by HOEPA. The Board, however, failed to use its broader powers under the Act to more substantially
expand the coverage or impact of the law.
The most successful effort by consumer and community advocates was
the push to effectively ban SPCI. Considered by many to be an egregious
predatory practice, SPCI involved selling people insurance that covers loan
payments should some calamity (for example, death or disability) occur.
SPCI was relatively unique among insurance products, however, in that it
was financed completely up-front into the loan. With SPCI, rather than pay
the premiums monthly or some other periodic way, the borrower paid the
entire five to ten years of insurance up-front via the premium being added
onto the mortgage amount. The lump-sum premiums for such policies
could amount to 15% of the principal amount of the loan. This increased
the loan amount and reduced borrower equity. Moreover, unlike in the
120. See Letter from Emery Rushton to Chief Executive Officers of All Nat’l Banks, supra note 117.
121. Id.
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case of insurance that is paid monthly, if the borrower got into trouble, she
could not stop paying the insurance portion of her monthly payment without defaulting on the mortgage.
Consumer and community groups began focusing on problems with the
product as a key focus of their anti-predatory lending campaigns. By the
summer of 2000, consumer activism on SPCI and the inherent problems
with the product compelled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pledge not to
purchase loans containing the product. Following this, the product was
condemned in the HUD/Treasury Report, and later in 2000, the Federal Reserve recommended including SPCI in the HOEPA definition of points and
fees. Then, by the summer of 2001, three large sellers of SPCI voluntarily
announced that they would no longer offer it. By the end of 2001, the Federal Reserve finalized its proposal to include SPCI in the definition of
points and fees, which essentially made any loan with SPCI a high-cost
loan under HOEPA and therefore subject to heightened regulation.122
1.

The OTS and OCC Act to Preempt State Regulation of High-Risk
Lending

As more states began to adopt predatory lending regulations in 2001 and
2002, lenders began to turn to Washington to push for lender-friendly federal policies that would override state laws. Lenders argued that state laws
would create a “patchwork” of regulation across the country that would reduce the efficiency of the banking system by making it difficult for lenders
and secondary market firms to operate national lending operations. Advocates of state laws, including governors, attorneys general, and legislators,
countered that states have a right to protect their citizens, especially when it
came to something as important as protection of homeowners and borrowers. Moreover, much of real estate law—including foreclosure law—
already varied across states, and mortgage markets had accommodated
such differences without causing significant harm to credit access. In fact,
by the early 2000s, vendors had begun marketing software that enabled
lenders to monitor compliance with various state predatory lending laws.
One firm, for example, marketed a product called the “Predatory Lending
Monitor,” which interfaced with major loan origination systems. From
September 2002 to March 2003, the company had completed nineteen installations of the product.123

122. See IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT, supra note 57, at 215-16.
123. Press Release, ExperITy Releases Version 2.0 of Its Predatory Lending Monitor
(Mar. 8, 2003), www.experity.com/press_releases/PR_3_18_2003.html.
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To block state predatory lending laws in the early 2000s, the lending industry pursued a mixed strategy of seeking a federal statute aimed at preempting state laws and, at the same time, trying to get federal bank regulators to preempt state laws. The first approach would remain difficult as
long as Democrats held significant power in the Senate and, perhaps more
importantly, as long as Senator Paul Sarbanes, a supporter of increased
mortgage regulation retained the ranking Democratic seat on the Senate
Banking committee. Therefore, lenders—particularly banks, thrifts and
bank-owned mortgage-companies—also adopted the second strategy. Both
thrifts and national banks appealed to their federal regulators (the OTS and
the OCC, respectively) to preempt state predatory lending regulations. The
OTS regulates federal savings banks and the OCC national banks. Federal
law gave both regulators significant ability to preempt state consumer protection regulations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they wielded such
power aggressively, rebuffing states’ attempts to adapt consumer protection
laws to a changing financial marketplace, something Congress and federal
regulators were not doing.
Unfortunately for those who favor state authority in this arena, some
federal regulators have a vested interest in preempting state consumer protection laws. The ability to preempt state law is perhaps the greatest source
of value in the federal thrift and national bank charters. Regulators can
gain political power based on the number and size of the banks that fall under their regulatory supervision. In the some cases, a regulator’s operations
are funded by levying fees on the institutions they regulate. This can encourage an agency to pursue policies that are friendly to banks—especially
larger ones. If a regulator does not use its ability to allow banks under its
supervision to preempt state consumer protection regulations, the bank may
change its charter so that it is regulated by a more lender-friendly agency.
The impacts of charter changes can be significant. Even one very large
bank shifting its charter to another regulator can significantly affect an
agency’s revenues. When Chase Manhattan Bank (now J.P. Morgan
Chase) merged with Chemical Bank in 1995 and changed from a national
to a state charter, it was estimated that the OCC lost 2% of its budget in
fees.124 Even if an agency’s funding is not directly tied to the banking assets under its supervision, if fewer and fewer institutions fall under its supervisory umbrella, its power and relevance will be called into question. In
the long run, this could jeopardize the agency’s very existence.

124. Richard J. Rosen, Senior Economist, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Presentation, 2002
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference: Is Three a Crowd? Competition Among Regulators in Banking (May 8, 2002).
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The more power that a regulator has to effectively override state regulations—and the more it exercises such power—the more likely it is that institutions will want to be chartered under that regulator’s authority. In the
past, competition between regulators was mostly restricted between the national bank (OCC) charter and the state charter (FDIC, Federal Reserve,
and state regulators). As thrifts were allowed to behave more like commercial banks, however, and banks became more involved in mortgage markets, the thrift-bank distinction became less meaningful, increasing the
competition among regulators.
There have been repeated concerns that banks “forum shop” to find the
most comfortable regulator.125 Since at least the late 1990s, this “race for
the bottom” includes regulators vying to offer banks as much preemption
power as they can. Demonstrating the importance of preemption to the
value of a charter type, a banking attorney was quoted in the American
Banker regarding the OCC’s preemption actions as asking, “Why would
you want a national charter but for the preemption authority?”126
The OTS moved first to override state mortgage regulations by preempting key provisions of Georgia’s predatory lending law in January of 2003,
so that federal thrifts were exempted from the law. A week later, it preempted New York’s state predatory lending law. State regulators immediately objected to the OTS moves. Community groups saw the OTS’ action—under Bush appointee James Gilleran—as particularly antagonistic,
given that the preceding director of the OTS, Clinton appointee Ellen
Seidman, had voiced some of the strongest concerns over predatory lending
among federal regulators.127
The OCC was not about to let the thrift charter gain a clear regulatory
advantage over the national bank charter. It had issued a letter to national
banks in November 2002 asserting its jurisdiction over all state regulators
and asked banks to inform it if a state regulator may have asserted its authority over a national bank. In comments to the press after the OTS decision, the OCC pointed out that it needed a request from a bank before it
could follow the OTS’ preemption move.128

125. See Ann B. Matasar & Deborah D. Pavelka, Federal Banking Regulators’ Competition in Laxity: Evidence from CRA Audits, 4 INT’L ADVANCES IN ECON. RES. 56, 56-57
(1998).
126. Todd Davenport, Why OCC May Tread Lightly on Georgia Law, AM. BANKER, Apr.
9, 2003, at 1.
127. Rob Blackwell, Second OTS Preemption: Predator Law in N.Y., AM. BANKER, Jan.
31, 2003, at 1.
128. Id.
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It was not long before a national bank, National City Bank of Cleveland,
requested that the OCC preempt the Georgia law. Community groups,
governors, attorneys general, and state legislatures argued that the OCC
should not move to preempt state consumer protection laws. In the summer
of 2003, the OCC did preempt the Georgia antipredatory lending law, even
after industry interests had succeeded in weakening the law at the state
level.129 The agency went on to suggest that it would preempt all similar
state laws, and issued proposed regulations to do so. The OCC’s move in
some ways was a more assertive move in defense of banks to ignore state
laws, because its authority under banking statutes to preempt state consumer protection laws was less well established.
Federal regulators went even further and argued that even mortgage
lenders that were subsidiaries of national banks or federal thrifts would
benefit from federal preemption. The federal courts upheld this position
when challenged by state regulators. The financial services regulator for
the state of Michigan challenged the ability of a mortgage company subsidiary of a national bank to escape state regulation.130 The state regulator
argued that because the mortgage company, Wachovia Mortgage, was not
itself a national bank but only the subsidiary of a national bank, Michigan’s
laws should not be preempted. In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court found in
favor of the bank, stating that the preemption powers given by the National
Banking Act covered subsidiaries of national banks as well as the banks
themselves.131
The policy debate between state and federal regulators over preemption
became quite heated, with some advocates for state regulation being particularly outspoken. Foremost among these was Elliott Spitzer, Attorney
General for New York State. In 2003, Spitzer threatened to sue the OCC
over its preemption activities.132 After Spitzer initiated an investigation
into racially discriminatory behavior by national banks in New York State,
however, the OCC joined an industry trade group in suing him and effectively prevented the investigation.133 Spitzer had perhaps a higher profile
than other advocates for the rights of states to regulate lending, but he was

129. U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption Determination and Order Concerning the Georgia Fair Lending Act, http://www.occ.treas.gov/gflaqas.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2009).
130. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 2 (2007).
131. See generally id.
132. Editorial, Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at C1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res
=9404EFDD173CF932A25751C1A9659C8B63.
133. Court Blocks Spitzer Inquiry into Loan Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at C3,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/13/business/13lend.html.
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not alone. Many other state regulators and attorneys general also argued
against the federal agency’s aggressive preemption practices as well.
During the second high risk boom in the mid-2000s, exotic mortgage
products became more widespread in both the prime and subprime markets.
As banks and thrifts became increasingly drawn into higher-risk markets,
and as the performance of such products began to show some weaknesses,
banking regulators issued some warnings about their use. In 2003, the
OCC issued another warning about the risks posed by subprime loans to the
banks it regulated. The agency was particularly concerned that national
banks might suffer “legal, reputation and other risks” in acquiring loans
through mortgage brokers or by purchasing loans from originators.134
Despite their issuing warnings about the risk to lenders involved in subprime lending, except for the modest changes to HOEPA in 2001, federal
policy-makers made essentially no substantive changes in regulations
aimed at curbing lending abuses and the growth of excessively risky lending practices in the subprime market. In fact, federal regulators facilitated
the expansion of high-risk lending and paved the way for the second highrisk boom by actively preempting states’ attempts to increase lending regulations when federal policy makers would not.
In the second high risk boom, there was an increase in the use of “alternative” or exotic loan structures, including interest-only, negative amortization and payment-option loans. These structures were applied to both the
subprime and prime markets. Subprime loans were increasingly structured
as hybrid adjustable rate loans in which the interest rate would be fixed for
two or three years and then allowed to adjust. Many prime loans were also
structured with adjustable rates. As different exotic features were layered
on top of each other, many observers became increasingly worried about
the underlying risk in the mortgage marketplace.
In the early to mid-2000s, consumer advocates and the U.S. General Accounting Office called on federal regulators to do more to regulate the affiliates and subsidiaries of banks that were increasingly dominating the
subprime and high-risk loan markets. In general, the supervision of these
lenders was left to state financial service regulators and to the Federal
Trade Commission, both of which lacked the level of supervisory resources
as the federal banking regulators. In early 2004, the General Accounting
Office issued a report calling for stronger regulatory supervision in the
subprime market and specifically called for giving the Federal Reserve
134. See Advisory Letter 2003-3 from U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans, to
Chief Executive Officers of All Nat’l Banks & Nat’l Bank Subsidiaries (Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-3.pdf.
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more explicit power to conduct regular examinations of lenders affiliated
with banks through bank holding company structures.135 Earlier in 2000,
Edward Gramlich, a Federal Reserve Board Governor, had urged Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Board, to direct examiners to examine the
lending of bank-affiliated mortgage companies on a pilot basis.136 The
suggestion was rebuffed by Chairman Greenspan.137
More generally, even though federal regulators had issued caution to
banks holding subprime loans directly on their balance sheets, they generally supported the growth of the subprime mortgage market. The most important support came in the form of the preemption of state consumer protection laws, but key federal regulators also issued statements and studies
that argued that subprime lending was providing increased homeownership
among minority and lower-income groups, which in turn gave support to
similar arguments made by industry lobbyists working against efforts in
Congress to increase regulation. The evidence presented for these claims,
however, was quite limited, and there was little analysis of the benefits and
costs associated with subprime lending or even whether subprime-financed
homeownership was economically beneficial to borrowers.
In July of 2003, the OCC released a controversial working paper entitled, “Economic Issues in Predatory Lending,” during the agency’s decision-making process over its first preemptions of state consumer protection
laws.138 The OCC study argued that state anti-predatory lending laws reduced levels of subprime lending and suggested that this was a negative
outcome because it reduced “credit availability.” It now looks quite likely
that subprime markets were, in fact, providing socially inefficient amounts
and types of credit. The OCC report relied primarily on a study by the industry-funded Credit Research Center at Georgetown University, which
found that the number of subprime originations in North Carolina had declined by approximately 14% as a result of the state passing the first antipredatory lending law. The OCC paper suggested that this was an undesirable effect of the law. Many would now likely question, however, whether
a decline in subprime lending of 14% was an undesirable result. By re-

135. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 9-10 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.
136. See Edward L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis
Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/
18/business/18subprime.html.
137. Id.
138. U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PREDATORY LENDING (2003).
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stricting abusive practices and reducing the number of loans with excessive
upfront fees, such laws are likely to discourage the riskiest loans.
The OCC was not alone in its support for the booming subprime industry. Federal Reserve Governor Gramlich gave a speech in 2004 that, while
acknowledging the problems of higher foreclosure rates in the subprime
market, clearly viewed higher levels of subprime lending as a positive
trend: “Despite the caveats, the net social evaluation of these trends is
probably a strong positive.”139 Only three years later, Gramlich seemed
much less certain on this count.140 Gramlich had also argued in 2004 that
“subprime lending represents a natural evolution of credit markets.”141
Gramlich was clearly not alone in this opinion, especially among economists at the federal regulatory agencies. Subprime lending was often
viewed as generally an organic, natural outgrowth of technological and financial innovation that was somehow purely the product of unfettered free
markets. Yet the history of deregulation and supportive policies supporting
structured mortgage finance suggests otherwise. Housing finance markets
are politically and socially constructed. They are the products of decades
of lobbying and policy debates at the state and federal levels.
In late 2005, as the market for exotic loans boomed and increasingly involved both prime and subprime loans, the four banking regulators issued
proposed guidance on “nontraditional” mortgage products—what many
called exotic loans—and issued final guidance in October of 2006.142 Responding to the late 2005 proposal, consumer groups warned that regulators
were not going nearly far enough. In particular, they argued that regulators
should direct lenders to underwrite adjustable rate loans using the maximum interest rate to which a loan might adjust. In fact, many subprime and
other adjustable rate loans were approved based on initial, low fixed introductory or “teaser” interest rates that later could adjust upwards a great
deal. Advocates also generally called for the essential prohibition of nodocumentation or stated-income loans, while regulators merely discouraged
the use of such products. Of course, the guidance was inherently limited in

139. Edward M. Gramlich, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Subprime Mortgage
Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges, Speech before the Financial Services Roundtable
Annual Housing Policy Meeting (May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Gramlich, Subprime], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm.
140. Edward M. Gramlich, Senior Fellow, Urban Inst., Booms and Busts: The Case of
Subprime Mortgages, Address in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411542_Gramlich_final.pdf.
141. See Gramlich, Subprime, supra note 139.
142. U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON NONTRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCT RISKS (2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20060929a1.pdf.
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its impact on the mortgage market, because it applied only to depository
institutions directly regulated by the four regulators and not to the many affiliate and independent mortgage companies that were, on average, more
active in the subprime and high-risk markets.
In 2006 and early 2007, as problems in subprime and higher risk market
segments became much clearer and caused significant disruptions to
broader financial markets, regulators responded with additional proposals
and hearings. The Federal Reserve Board held hearings related to subprime and predatory lending in both 2006 and 2007 and, in early 2007, issued a draft proposal for increased regulation of the subprime market. After the 2007 hearings, the Board issued a more complete set of regulatory
proposals with particular attention to using HOEPA to regulate a substantially broader segment of the subprime market, rather than just the very
high-cost segment that HOEPA had been used to address previously.
After the fall 2006 election, when Democrats gained control of the
House of Representatives and Barney Frank (D-MA) took over as chair of
the House Financial Services Committee, there was also some movement in
the legislative arena. Frank sponsored a bill that contained many substantive regulations that consumer advocates had been proposing for over a
decade. The bill that eventually passed the House in 2007, however, also
contained some key language that would preempt some state efforts to impose assignee liability in a stronger way than the federal law would. Despite the fact that the 2007–2008 subprime crisis had been caused in large
part by breakdowns in the mortgage supply chain—which is precisely what
assignee liability is designed to guard against—industry lobbyists had once
again successfully weakened the law in this regard.
Of course, by late 2007, a good deal of the damage done by high-risk
lending had already been put in motion and the subprime market had been
substantially shut down. Therefore, proposals to increase regulation would
be relevant in the longer term to prevent a repeat of mortgage market excesses and abuses. Many of the proposals both in the Frank bill and in the
proposed HOEPA regulations would constitute significant regulatory improvements and help set the stage for sounder lending markets going forward.
CONCLUSION
The risks and costs of poorly regulated, high-risk lending markets had
become clear during an earlier, but somewhat smaller, boom in high-risk
lending in the middle to late 1990s. For a variety of reasons, some of
which are beyond the scope of this Article, the knowledge of the problems
and costs of high-risk lending had minimal impact on policy making.
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While regulators and legislators in office during the more recent 2002–
2007 high-risk lending boom could have done much more to reduce the
eventual fallout, the seeds of the fundamentally flawed market structures
and regulatory systems that allowed the crisis to develop had been sowed
much earlier.
Since the early 1980s, there has been a deliberate movement, aggressively promoted by the financial services sector, by some in Congress, federal regulatory agencies, to reduce the public sector oversight of the financial services sector. The proponents of deregulation—and of adapting
regulations or supervision to emerging market segments—have argued that
reducing the regulatory restrictions on the financial system unleashes free
market efficiencies. In their perspective, less government involvement is
almost always seen as a superior model for any form of exchange of goods
or services.
In the arena of financial services regulation, the shift over the last thirty
years toward increasingly deregulationist policies has been at least as political as any other phase in U.S. history. Some argue that the successes of
deregulationist advocates have been related, both as a cause and a result, to
the increasing concentration of wealth in the United States. In a vicious
cycle, financial services providers are served well by deregulation and are
then able to push for even more deregulation.
Lobbying by the financial industry, however, has not been the only factor supporting deregulation. Public policies are shaped by more than a
simple competition of special interests; they are shaped by the competition
of ideas.143 Clearly, both interests and ideology have been important in
shaping policy in this arena. Campaign finance and the dominance of corporate lobbyists have clearly been important in continuing movement toward the deregulation of mortgage and consumer finance. Deregulationist,
free-market ideology has been accepted, however, even by many who do
not have clear financial interests in an unregulated financial system. By the
late twentieth century, many policy-makers had developed priorities that
include strong anti-regulatory postures. Regulation often became viewed
as inherently ineffective or counterproductive.
One effect of the recent devotion to free markets, however, has been to
conceal the highly political nature of banking and credit markets. It has
served to mask the extent to which market developments in mortgage finance were derived from a long history of government action and involvement. To hear some analysts describe financial developments, one might
143. For more discussion of ideology and housing policy, see R.A. HAYS, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING: IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed.
1995).
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gather that private entrepreneurs and lenders developed most of the successful innovations and developments in consumer finance and mortgage
markets, while public sector involvement had only been counterproductive.
In fact, government actors created, subsidized, and institutionalized many
of the most successful, sustainable, and risk-limiting mortgage products
and practices since the early part of the twentieth century. This includes
the long-term fully amortizing mortgage, private mortgage insurance (especially in its recent forms), and all sorts of standardization and discipline
that enhanced the stability of the financial services industry and served to
limit foreclosure risk in mortgage markets. Meanwhile, many private sector innovations, such as highly structured and multiple-order securitizations, stated-income and piggy-back loans, and others, have proven to be
abject failures.
Of course, public policy has aided and abetted some harmful developments as well as positive ones and, specifically, had a significant role in
paving the way for a fundamentally flawed system of structured mortgage
finance that was the principal driver of the 2007–2008 crisis. But the principal policy approach that encouraged and enabled the boom-bust problems
of recent decades was comprised largely of deregulation and the preemption of states’ efforts to regulate when they felt federal regulation lacking.
It has become painfully obvious that mortgage markets are not well
served by a deregulationist paradigm. Periods of stability and incremental
progress towards access to affordable and sound credit and capital have involved a strong, proactive role for the public sector, both in terms of providing and standardizing risk-limiting mortgage products and in terms of
providing a regulatory infrastructure that constrains market booms and
busts.
The flood of high-risk credit after 2002 was fundamentally enabled by a
strong, deregulationist push on the part of the financial services industry, as
well as many federal policy-makers, to avoid or eviscerate state and federal
regulation and constraints that had resulted in a robust, but risk-limiting,
mortgage finance system. Especially since the 1980s, deregulationist
forces typically dominated the development of consumer and mortgage finance policy. These policies paved the way for the connection of unrestrained global capital markets to create investment structures designed
primarily to speed the flow of high-cost and high-risk credit to local communities, and especially to communities most vulnerable to such costs and
risks.
The market structures that developed under a very weak regime of government oversight and regulation—although sometimes with specific tax
and legal advantages—ignored the very powerful negative spillovers of ex-
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cessively risky and irresponsible lending. The result was that mortgage
lending was not treated much differently than markets for most massmarketed consumer products. There was little thought given to the fundamentally distinct nature of real estate and housing, or to the impacts of
foreclosure on households’ long-term economic prospects and on
neighborhoods and cities.

